Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law
Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 3
Issue 4 1996

Article 4

1996

Redefining CERCLA Arranger Liability: Making the Responsible
Party Pay. United States v. TIC Investment Corporation
Marc D. Poston

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Marc D. Poston, Redefining CERCLA Arranger Liability: Making the Responsible Party Pay. United States v.
TIC Investment Corporation , 3 Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 216 (1996)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl/vol3/iss4/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law by an
authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Redefining CERCLA Arranger
Liability: Making the
Responsible Party Pay
United States v. TIC Investment Corporation'
by Marc D. Poston
corporations that arrange for the disposal
The United States Environmental Pro- of hazardous substances.
tection Agency reports that 73 million
Americans live within four miles of a site II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1971, White Farm Equipment
that is contaminated with hazardous substances.' The health, safety, and environ- Company (WFE) became the owner and
mental risks posed by these sites operator of a "form implement manufacprompted a public outcry to remedy this turing plant in Charles City, Iowa."'
problem. By enacting the Comprehen- Hazardous waste generated at the plant
sive Environmental Response, Compensa- was disposed of at a dumpsite owned by
tion & Liability Act (CERCLA), Congress H.E. Construction Company (HEC).
required those responsible for the con- HEC transported the waste to the dumptamination to pay the costs of remedia- site in accordance to an agreement with
This has raised questions WFE. 6
tion. 3
In 1980, TICI purchased WFE. TICI
concerning the applicability of CERCLA
(also known as Superfund) against corpo- owned WFE for only one year, when TIC
rate officers and parent corporations, par- United Corporation (TICU), purchased the
ties which have traditionally been company. Although TICI and TICU were
protected from tort liability. Until the deci- the new owners of WFE, disposal pracsion in United States v. TIC Investment tices continued through 1985.' ThroughCorporation (TICI), courts have failed to out this period, Stratton Georgoulis was
establish a standard for determining liabil- the sole shareholder, president, and
parent chairman of the board of both TICI and
ity against officers and
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TICU.' Georgoulis also acted as the
chairman of the board for WFE and
served as president of WFE during part
of this time.9 Georgoulis was also president and chairman of the board of TIC
Services, a subsidiary of TICI which provided services to TICI and TICU including
"insurance, accounting, legal and tax
work, and payment of employee
salaries." 10
It is believed that during this five-year
period, neither Georgoulis nor any employee of TIC entities (TICI, TICU, and
TIC Services) was involved in or had
knowledge of the hazardous waste disposal practices of WFE.i'
However,
Georgoulis did exert direct control over
much of WFE's operations and management.12 Georgoulis frequented the WFE
corporate offices and spoke daily with
WFE officers." He also was involved in
most of the personnel matters and had
final authority over the hiring of WFE employees." Furthermore, Georgoulis personally made a decision to "close and
consolidate some of WFE's operaAs chairman of WFE's twotions.""
member board of directors, Georgoulis
took part in most of the corporate
decisions. 16
During TIC's ownership of WFE, TICI
and TICU also exercised control over the
TICI and TICU
operations of WFE.i'
management made many personnel decisions at WFE.' 8 Inaddition, TIC Services
had a hand in WFE operations, including
paying WFE salaries and billing WFE for

Redefining CERCLA Arranger Liability
reimbursement. "
In 1983, WFE refinanced and was
required to increase its board of directors
from two to five members. 20 Georgoulis
remained chairman of the board following this change. 21 WFE defaulted on the
refinancing loan in 1985 and was subsequently sold to Allied Products Corporation. 22 In 1988, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
listed the HEC dumpsite on its National
Priorities List, and soon thereafter began
site remediation. 23 Both the EPA and Allied provided response costs for this remediation and brought individual cost
recovery actions against the defendants
for the hazardous waste contributed by
WFE.24
Georgoulis argued that CERCLA arranger liability does not apply to corporate officers and directors, "without proof
of any intentional participation in the arrangement for disposal of the hazardous
substance.",2 TICI made the same argument for parent corporation liability, arguing that "intentional participation in the
arrangement for disposal" of hazardous
waste is required before arranger liability
for parent corporations can be found under CERCIA. 2
The case was heard before the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. 27 The District Court found in
favor of Allied and the EPA, and entered
partial summary judgment against TICI
19 Id.
2
TIC Investment,
21 Id.

and Georgoulis, holding the defendants
directly liable, under CERCLA, as arrangers for the disposal of hazardous waste."
The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding in part and reversed in
part.29 According to the court of Appeals, CERCLA imposes arranger liability
against corporate officers, directors, and
parent corporations where that entity had
"the authority to control and did in fact
exercise actual or substantial control, directly or indirectly, over the arrangement
for disposal, or the off-site disposal, of
hazardous substances."o

Ill. LEGAL HISTORY
A. Congress Enacts CERCLA
By the late 1970's, it was clear to
Congress that the United States was dotted with hazardous waste disposal sites
in need of cleaning. The serious environmental and health related risks posed by
these sites inspired the enactment of CERCIA in 1980. CERCLA lists four categories of parties that may be held
responsible for the response costs associated with the remediation of a particular
Superfund site. Those persons are: 1)the
current owner or operator of the facility;
2) the past owner or operator of the facility; 3) the person responsible for arranging the disposal or treatment of the
hazardous waste; and 4) the transporter
of the hazardous waste.3' "Persons," as

defined in CERCLA, includes both individuals and corporations.32
Liability under CERCIA is governed by
§ 107 of the statute. Most statutes operate prospectively. CERCLA, however,
was enacted for the express purpose of
addressing hazards caused by past
waste disposal practices. Consequently,
it has been held to apply retroactively. In
addition, CERCLA has been interpreted to
impose strict liability, liability without
fault.33 Furthermore, most court cases
have held that CERCLA imposes joint and
several liability, meaning that any party
found responsible for cleanup at the site
can be liable for the entire cost of remediation regardless of how little they contributed.34
While each of the four
categories of parties that may be held
responsible for response costs under CERCIA appear to be treated equally in the
statute, courts have varied the standards
used and the liability imposed for each
group. The liability imposed on individual officers of parent corporations have
subsumed considerable litigation and
debate.
B. Officer Liability
Corporations were conceived for the
primary purpose of limiting the liability of
officers and shareholders.15 A corporation is a legal entity separate from its
owners and officers.31 Shareholder liability, therefore, is limited by the amount of
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Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCIA and the "Erosion" of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 Nw.
U.L. REv. 259, 265 (1992). 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(32) states "[t]he term 'liable' or 'liability' under this subchapter shall be construed to be the standard of liability which obtains under section 1321 of
Title 33." This is referring to the Clean Water Act which has been held to impose strict liability upon violators of the Act.
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the individual shareholder's investment in
the corporation.17 Officers also are protected from corporate actions." This corporate veil is necessary to encourage
commerce and free enterprise by protecting corporate officers and shareholders
from some of the risks associated with

business ventures. 39
This protection, however, is not absolute. Officer that consent to or personally
participate "in the tortuous or illegal acts
of the corporation are not afforded pro-

tection under this traditional corporate
law doctrine.""o There must be actual
participation on the part of the officer
"through affirmative actions of direction,
sanction, or cooperation in the wrongful
acts of commission or omission. Merely
being an officer, as such, is insufficient to
create liability.42
Courts consistently have found officer
liability under CERCLA since its enactment
in 1980. Three separate theories have
been developed to address this issue.43
All three theories require a level of personal involvement in the tortuous acts, although each seeks this involvement in a
different manner.
The first of these theories is the
"personal participation" theory.44 This
theory is best represented in U.S. v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical
Co., Inc. (NEPACCO).45 In NEPACCO,

the corporate officer in question was actually involved in the disposal practices, but
argued to the Eighth Circuit that there
should be no personal liability "because
he acted solely as a corporate officer or
employee." 46 The court opined that the
officer was not being held liable because
of his position with NEPACCO, rather he
was "individually liable.., because he
personally arranged for the transportation
and disposal of hazardous substances." 7
The court, citing Donsco, Inc. v. Casper
Corp., stated "[a] corporate officer is individually liable for the torts he [or she]
personally commits [on behalf of the corporation] and cannot shield himself [or
herself] behind a corporation when he [or
she] is an actual participant in the tort." 48
Two rationales have been used by
courts in applying the personal participation theory.4 9 Both the traditional corporate law doctrine and a reading of the
statutory language of CERCLA have been
cited.5 o The underlying principle of the
personal participation theory, however,
follows more closely with the traditional
corporate law doctrine, holding officers
liable for environmental torts in the same
manner that they would be held liable for
other torts in which they have personally
participated. 51
The second theory used in addressing
corporate officer liability is the "control

theory."S2 This theory "focus[es] more
upon the officer's authority or ability to
direct corporate activities than upon the
officer's actual involvement in the unlawful activity."5 1 While this theory was
originally devised to hold an "operator"
liable, NEPACCO expanded the theory
to include liability against arrangers.54
The court in NEPACCO stated that "[i]t is
the authority to control" hazardous waste
disposal that is"critical under the statutory
scheme. "
Since NEPACCO, the control theory
has been somewhat refined in the Eighth
Circuit while remaining unchanged in
other circuits. The Eighth Circuit in U.S.
v. Vertac Chemical Corporation,5 6
claimed the control theory alone was too
of
interpretation"
[an]
"broad
NEPACCO, and held that the mere
authority to control was not adequate to
find liability as an arranger. 7 In U.S. v.
Gurley,5 1 the court also found this standard too broad, but in the context of operator liability, not arranger liability,
requiring "some type of action or affirmative conduct" to equate control of an opIt is, therefore, still
eration.59
questionable how the control theory will
be applied to arrangers under CERCIA.
The last theory of officer liability under
CERCIA is the "prevention theory.""

48

Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. ENWr.
AFF. L.REv.
579, n. 8 (1993).
Oswald & Schipani, supra note 33, at 262.
Oswald, supro note 41. The corporation can also be held liable for the tortuous acts of its officers under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id.
Id.
Id.
Oswald & Schipani, supro note 33, at 272-73.
Id. at 273, 275.
8 10 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 744.
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NEPACCO, 8 10 F.2d at 744 (citing Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978)1.
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This theory has had little effect upon CERCLA cases and has not surfaced in the
Eighth Circuit. Where applied, courts
appear to focus on an officer's "ability to
prevent harm from improper waste activities." 6 Officer's that attempt to prevent
improper disposal practices will be
treated more lenient by courts in assessing liability, thus creating an "incentive"
for officers to practice proper waste handling procedures.62
C. Parent Corporation Liability
The history of parent corporation liability under CERCLA can be traced to
cases dealing with operator liability.
These cases adopt three different tests; an
"actual
control
test",
an
"authority-to-control test", and a piercing
the corporate veil test.63 The actual control test was used by the First Circuit in
U.S. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., /nc."
The
court held that mere ownership and an
ability to control was insufficient to impose operator liability.65 At a minimum,
the court stated, an "active involvement in
the activities of the subsidiary" is
required. 6
The second test, the authority-to-control
test, is a less stringent minority view that
only requires a "capability to control." 67
The Fourth Circuit adopted this test in Nurod, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons
6

Co.,68 finding operator liability where
actual control was not exercised. Here,
the mere existence of an authority to control was sufficient for liability.69
The third test, which is also a minority
view, finds liability only if the court can
reach the parent corporation by piercing
the corporate veil. 70 The first appellate
court to apply this test was the Fifth Circuit
in Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. TL.James
& Co., Inc.," which held that the parent
corporation must control the subservient
corporation to an extent that it does not
act on its own interests, but operates
solely to benefit the parent corporation.72
Again, these cases have dealt with
operator liability and have not addressed
arranger liability for parent corporations.
Furthermore, the treatment of parent corporation liability under CERCLA in general has yet to be decided by most
courts. The Eighth Circuit in TIC addressed the issue of arranger liability for
both parent corporations and corporate
officers as a matter of first impression.

liability as an arranger. ' Georgoulis
argued that the appropriate standard for
arranger liability is one of specific intent,
noting that he had no knowledge of TICs
disposal activities and therefore lacked
the intent necessary to find liability.76
Georgoulis also claimed that according
to the holding in Gurley, arranger liability
can be found only where the defendant
has the authority to control disposal practices, and exercises that authority over the
disposal practices of the corporation."
The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument. Looking at the legislative history of
CERCLA for guidance, the court noted
that Congress, first and foremost, wanted
to make sure those persons responsible
for the disposal of hazardous substances
were the parties paying the site remediation costs.7 8 The court also noted that
Congress wished to prevent those responsible persons from avoiding liability by
"closing their eyes" to disposal
practices./
Next, the court spent a considerable
amount of time analyzing the decision in
IV. INSTANT DECISION
Gurley.80 The defendants had argued
The Eighth Circuit Court in TIC began that Gurley supported their claim against
their analysis by categorizing the defen- arranger liability, but the court turned that
dant's liability, indicating that they were contention around and said that Gurley in
deciding the issue of arranger liability as fact supported arranger liability against
a matter of first impression. 74 First, the Georgoulis. 8 ' The Gurley court had discourt addressed the issue of Georgoulis' tinguished the individual in that case, a
non-officer, non-director, non-shareholder

Oswald & Schipani, supro note 33, at 291.
Kurt A. Strassert & Denise Rodosevich, Seeing the Forest for the Trees in CERCIA Liability, 10 YALEJ.ON REG. 493, 5 11 (1993).
Oswald & Schiponi, supro note 33, at 293-94.
Lansford-CoaldoleJoint Water Authority v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 (1993); U.S. v. TIC Investment, 68 F.3d 1082, 1091 (8th Cir. 1995).
910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990).
Id.

Id.
tansford-Cooldale, 4 F.3d at 1221.
966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992).
Id.
U.S. v. TIC Investment, 68 F.3d 1082, 1091 (8th Cir. 1995).
893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id.at 83-84.
U.S. v. TIC Investment, 68 F.3d 1082, 1096 (8th Cir. 1995).
Id.at 1085-86.
Id. at 1086.
Id.
Id. at 1087.
Id. at 1088.
Id.
Id. at 1088-89.
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employee, from an individual holding a
position as officer, director, or shareholder, stating "officers, directors, or
shareholders are more likely to cause a
company to dispose of hazardous
waste."8 2 The court in TIC agreed with
that statement, noting that such a policy is
expressly aimed at closing "loophole[s]
for powerful individuals like Georgoulis." 83 The court stated that allowing
individuals with "virtually unlimited" control over a corporation to escape liaiblity
by shutting their eyes to the corporation's
disposal practices would be unjust, particularly since an employee with limited
decision-making authority could still be
held liable as an arranger.8" Again, the
court maintained the policy justification
that the goal of CERCLA is to "place the
ultimate responsibility for clean up on
The court also
those responsible.""
agreed with a point raised by the United
States that a specific intent standard
would protect individuals who control the
"day -to-day... budgets, production, and
capital investment," but fail to consider
the "cost-cutting disposal practices" of the
The standard concorporation. 86
ceived by the Eighth Circuit in TIC imposes CERCLA arranger liability upon a
"corporate officer or director if he or she
had the authority to control and did in
fact exercise actual or substantial control,
directly or indirectly, over the arrangement for disposal, or the off-site disposal,
of hazardous substances." 87 Such a
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
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90
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Id.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at

against "a parent corporation if the parent had the authority to control and exercised actual or substantial control, directly
or indirectly, over the arrangement for
disposal, or the off-site disposal, of the
subsidiary's hazardous substances.""
The same "fact-intensive inquiry" utilized
against Georgoulis was used
conducted."
The court accordingly applied such against TICI and TICU to determine if
an examination to the facts of TIC.' The there was sufficient evidence to support a
control that Georgoulis exerted over finding of parent corporation liability.98
WFE, the court found, did not allow oth- In this instance, however, the court held
ers to have any authority over corporate the facts were not sufficient to warrant
decisions, including decisions concerning summary judgment, and reversed the
the disposal of hazardous substances."1 judgment of the district court."
While the court's decision stated that
Georgoulis would have avoided liability V. COMMENT
had he delegated decision-making
Since its enactment in 1978, CERauthority among corporate employees, CLA has been criticized by commentasuch a delegation did not take place. 92 tors. Many claim the lame-duck session
Instead, the court found that Georgoulis of Congress that enacted CERCLA left the
controlled "virtually every aspect of language of the statute too vague and
WFE's operations" and that it was open for judicial interpretation. " This
"therefore beyond genuine dispute that vagueness, they claim, has led to an erohe exercised substantial indirect control sion of the traditional corporate law docover the disposal arrangement." 93 In the trine. Although it is inevitable that TIC
end, the court held that there was suffi- will be looked upon by these commentacient evidence to establish arranger liabil- tors as furthering that erosion, such an
ity against Georgoulis.94
interpretation would be incorrect.
Having settled the issue of corporate
The debate as to whether CERCLA
officer liability, the court turned to the is- liability should extend to officers and parsue of parent corporation liability against ent corporations is really one of competTICI and TICU." Here the court simply ing public policies. On one side stand
applied the same standard discussed those in support of a more extensive liabilabove for officer liability.9 6 They held ity scheme, desiring a cleaner environthat arranger liability can be found ment that will ultimately protect the heath
standard, claimed the court, dispels the
defendant's argument that every chief officer with authority will automatically be
liable as an arranger." In applying this
standard, the court held that a
"fact-intensive examination of the totality
must be
of the circumstances"

1089.

1090,
1990.

1091.
1092.

1092-93.
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and safety of everyone, while on the
other stand those who argue that corporate officers, directors, shareholders, and
parent corporations should be protected
from liability, erroneously maintaining that
the formation of corporations will be discouraged, and the public interest in promoting commerce and free trade will be
harmed. A thorough analysis of TIC
shows how the court considered and
dealt with both of these underlying
policies
The traditional corporate law doctrine, as discussed, supro, protects corporate officers and parent corporations from
liability unless there is actual participation
on the part of the officer or parent corporation. The decision in TIC clearly does
not depart from this principle. The court
carefully set out the standard for arranger
liability so as to protect officers and parent corporations from incurring liability
based solely on their position within the
corporation. TIC requires control, direct
or indirect, over the disposal of hazardous substances before liability can be
found. This can, in no way, however, be
seen as an erosion of either CERCLA's
liability scheme or traditional corporate
law doctrine. Nowhere within the arranger provision of CERCLA is there any
language limiting liability to only those
who directly arrange for the disposal of
hazardous substances and nowhere
within the traditional corporate law doctrine is there a loophole for those officers
and parent corporations who indirectly
commit torts. Those responsible, either
directly or indirectly, can be held liable
whether under TIC or traditional corporate law.
Opponents of officer and parent corporation liability under CERCLA argue
that past court decisions have held officers and parent corporations liable based
on their mere position to the corporate
PRP. That is, they claim courts do not

look at the actions of that officer or parent
corporation, rather they simply find liability by determining whether the officer or
parent corporation had the authority to
control the disposal. This, however, is
not an accurate representation of the decision in TIC; TIC created a standard that
requires more. Not only does TIC prevent the mere authority to control from creating liability, but it calls for a
fact-intensive inquiry to determine whether
that level of control was "substantial."
This protects the innocent officer or parent
corporation that has delegated most of
his or her authority and has retained little
or no control over the disposal of the hazardous waste. It requires a court to look
past mere titles by determining who had
the authority to control, as well as who
did control the disposal practices of the
corporation. By finding this origin of control, courts will be able to better assess
who is truly liable and responsible for the
improper disposal.
Another argument opponents of officer and parent corporation liability pose
is that protecting the corporate form will
promote commerce and free trade.
While this may be true as a general statement, it has no application in this context.
Ifan officer or parent corporation alters its
corporate activity for fear of arranger liability then CERCLA will have served the
additional beneficial purpose of deterring
harmful behavior. While CERCLA normally deters the acting arranger from mishandling hazardous waste, an extension
of CERCLA liability to corporate officers
and parent corporations would deter
those who set policy, guide the decision
making process, and make management
decisions for the corporation from ever
becoming arrangers. This will ultimately
decrease the amount of hazardous waste
entering Superfund sites. Besides acting
as a general deterrent, Congress itself
has stated that CERCLA liability would be

beneficial to the economy by encouraging the internalization of costs. 01 By
requiring corporations to properly dispose
of hazardous substances during production, the market price of goods will adequately reflect their production costs. 102
In addition, Congress has stressed that it
will cost a corporation less to implement
and utilize proper disposal practices than
it will to pay Superfund remediation
costs. 103

It is clear that the court's holding in
TIC is consistent with both the traditional
purpose of CERCLA as a remedial statute
and traditional corporate law doctrine.
The liability scheme formulated in TIC will
prevent responsible parties from escaping
liability while equally protecting innocent
parties from incurring liability. Since the
enactment of CERCLA, the Eighth Circuit
is the first to adopt a solid standard for
arranger liability that effectively employs
both these policies. Although TIC refers
specifically to corporate officer and parent corporation liability, this standard
could easily be expanded to encompass
directors, shareholders, and most other
PRP's that would potentially be liable as
arrangers under CERCLA.

VI. CONctusioN
Despite potentially competing public
policies, it is overwhelmingly clear that
the public desires to eliminate the health,
safety, and environmental risks created at
Congress acknowlSuperfund sites.
edged this with the enactment of CERCIA, and the court in TIC reaffirmed this
desire in its decision. The Eighth Circuit
has finally settled the long overdue question of arranger liability. Hopefully, this
decision will become the benchmark
other jurisdictions will adopt in the future.

"01 Michael P. Healy, Direct Liability for Hazardous Substance Cleanups Under CERCLA: A Comprehensive Approach, 42 Case W. Res. 65, 79-80 (1992)
(citing S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1980)).
102 Id. at 80.
103 Id
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